The default encoding is 'buffer'. When the input is a string, treat it
as 'binary'. Fixes the following assertion:
node: ../src/string_bytes.cc:309: static size_t
node::StringBytes::StorageSize(v8::Handle<v8::Value>, node::encoding):
Assertion `0 && "buffer encoding specified but string provided"'
failed.
Introduced in 64fc34b2.
Fixes #5482.
Test case:
var t = setInterval(function() {}, 1);
process.nextTick(t.unref);
Output:
Assertion failed: (args.Holder()->InternalFieldCount() > 0),
function Unref, file ../src/handle_wrap.cc, line 78.
setInterval() returns a binding layer object. Make it stop doing that,
wrap the raw process.binding('timer_wrap').Timer object in a Timeout
object.
Fixes #4261.
This also templatizes the Buffer::*Slice functions, and the template
function probably cannot be safely used outside of Node. However, it
also SHOULD not be used outside of Node, so this is arguably a feature
as well as a caveat.
Pretty much everything assumes strings to be utf-8, but crypto
traditionally used binary strings, so we need to keep the default
that way until most users get off of that pattern.
If there is an encoding, and we do 'stream.push(chunk, enc)', and the
encoding argument matches the stated encoding, then we're converting from
a string, to a buffer, and then back to a string. Of course, this is a
completely pointless bit of work, so it's best to avoid it when we know
that we can do so safely.
Commit 9352c19 ("child_process: don't emit same handle twice") trades
one bug for another.
Before said commit, a handle was sometimes delivered with messages it
didn't belong to.
The bug fix introduced another bug that needs some explaining. On UNIX
systems, handles are basically file descriptors that are passed around
with the sendmsg() and recvmsg() system calls, using auxiliary data
(SCM_RIGHTS) as the transport.
node.js and libuv depend on the fact that none of the supported systems
ever emit more than one SCM_RIGHTS message from a recvmsg() syscall.
That assumption is something we should probably address someday for the
sake of portability but that's a separate discussion.
So, SCM_RIGHTS messages are never coalesced. SCM_RIGHTS and normal
messages however _are_ coalesced. That is, recvmsg() might return this:
recvmsg(); // { "message-with-fd", "message", "message" }
The operating system implicitly breaks pending messages along
SCM_RIGHTS boundaries. Most Unices break before such messages but Linux
also breaks _after_ them. When the sender looks like this:
sendmsg("message");
sendmsg("message-with-fd");
sendmsg("message");
Then on most Unices the receiver sees messages arriving like this:
recvmsg(); // { "message" }
recvmsg(); // { "message-with-fd", "message" }
The bug fix in commit 9352c19 assumes this behavior. On Linux however,
those messages can also come in like this:
recvmsg(); // { "message", "message-with-fd" }
recvmsg(); // { "message" }
In other words, it's incorrect to assume that the file descriptor is
always attached to the first message. This commit makes node wise up.
Fixes #5330.
Preserve default install prefix seen in process.config, but use DESTDIR
for installing to deliniate 32/64 versions, avoid conflicts with PREFIX
settings in config.mk
Change vcbuild.bat to ignore VCINSTALLDIR environment variable,
always check for specific VS version and set GYP_MSVS_VERSION
accordingly. Otherwise GYP generates project files in format
that cannot be compiled by VS2012.
When developer calls setBreakpoint with an unknown script name,
we convert the script name into regular expression matching all
paths ending with given name (name can be a relative path too).
To create such breakpoint in V8, we use type `scriptRegEx`
instead of `scriptId` for `setbreakpoint` request.
To restore such breakpoint, we save the original script name
send by the user. We use this original name to set (restore)
breakpoint in the new child process.
This is a back-port of commit 5db936d from the master branch.
After much investigation it turns out that the affected servers are
buggy. user-service.condenastdigital.com:443 in particular seems to
reject large TLS handshake records. Cutting down the number of
advertised ciphers or disabling SNI fixes the issue.
Similarly, passing { secureOptions: constants.SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_2 }
seems to fix most connection issues with IIS servers.
Having to work around buggy servers is annoying for our users but not
a reason to downgrade OpenSSL. Therefore, revert it.
This reverts commit 4fdb8acdae.
Several people have reported issues with IIS and Resin servers (or maybe
SSL terminators sitting in front of those servers) that are fixed by
downgrading OpenSSL. The AESNI performance improvements were nice but
stability is more important. Downgrade OpenSSL from 1.0.1e to 1.0.0f.
Fixes #5360 (and others).
