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65 lines
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65 lines
3.1 KiB
Plaintext
==========================
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Django 1.5.9 release notes
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==========================
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*August 20, 2014*
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Django 1.5.9 fixes several security issues in 1.5.8.
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``reverse()`` could generate URLs pointing to other hosts
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=========================================================
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In certain situations, URL reversing could generate scheme-relative URLs (URLs
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starting with two slashes), which could unexpectedly redirect a user to a
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different host. An attacker could exploit this, for example, by redirecting
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users to a phishing site designed to ask for user's passwords.
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To remedy this, URL reversing now ensures that no URL starts with two slashes
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(//), replacing the second slash with its URL encoded counterpart (%2F). This
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approach ensures that semantics stay the same, while making the URL relative to
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the domain and not to the scheme.
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File upload denial-of-service
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=============================
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Before this release, Django's file upload handing in its default configuration
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may degrade to producing a huge number of ``os.stat()`` system calls when a
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duplicate filename is uploaded. Since ``stat()`` may invoke IO, this may produce
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a huge data-dependent slowdown that slowly worsens over time. The net result is
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that given enough time, a user with the ability to upload files can cause poor
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performance in the upload handler, eventually causing it to become very slow
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simply by uploading 0-byte files. At this point, even a slow network connection
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and few HTTP requests would be all that is necessary to make a site unavailable.
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We've remedied the issue by changing the algorithm for generating file names
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if a file with the uploaded name already exists.
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:meth:`Storage.get_available_name()
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<django.core.files.storage.Storage.get_available_name>` now appends an
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underscore plus a random 7 character alphanumeric string (e.g. ``"_x3a1gho"``),
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rather than iterating through an underscore followed by a number (e.g. ``"_1"``,
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``"_2"``, etc.).
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``RemoteUserMiddleware`` session hijacking
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==========================================
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When using the :class:`~django.contrib.auth.middleware.RemoteUserMiddleware`
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and the ``RemoteUserBackend``, a change to the ``REMOTE_USER`` header between
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requests without an intervening logout could result in the prior user's session
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being co-opted by the subsequent user. The middleware now logs the user out on
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a failed login attempt.
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Data leakage via query string manipulation in ``contrib.admin``
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===============================================================
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In older versions of Django it was possible to reveal any field's data by
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modifying the "popup" and "to_field" parameters of the query string on an admin
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change form page. For example, requesting a URL like
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``/admin/auth/user/?pop=1&t=password`` and viewing the page's HTML allowed
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viewing the password hash of each user. While the admin requires users to have
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permissions to view the change form pages in the first place, this could leak
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data if you rely on users having access to view only certain fields on a model.
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To address the issue, an exception will now be raised if a ``to_field`` value
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that isn't a related field to a model that has been registered with the admin
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is specified.
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