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58 lines
2.8 KiB
Plaintext
58 lines
2.8 KiB
Plaintext
===========================
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Django 2.1.11 release notes
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===========================
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*August 1, 2019*
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Django 2.1.11 fixes security issues in 2.1.10.
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CVE-2019-14232: Denial-of-service possibility in ``django.utils.text.Truncator``
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================================================================================
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If ``django.utils.text.Truncator``'s ``chars()`` and ``words()`` methods
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were passed the ``html=True`` argument, they were extremely slow to evaluate
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certain inputs due to a catastrophic backtracking vulnerability in a regular
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expression. The ``chars()`` and ``words()`` methods are used to implement the
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:tfilter:`truncatechars_html` and :tfilter:`truncatewords_html` template
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filters, which were thus vulnerable.
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The regular expressions used by ``Truncator`` have been simplified in order to
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avoid potential backtracking issues. As a consequence, trailing punctuation may
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now at times be included in the truncated output.
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CVE-2019-14233: Denial-of-service possibility in ``strip_tags()``
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=================================================================
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Due to the behavior of the underlying ``HTMLParser``,
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:func:`django.utils.html.strip_tags` would be extremely slow to evaluate
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certain inputs containing large sequences of nested incomplete HTML entities.
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The ``strip_tags()`` method is used to implement the corresponding
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:tfilter:`striptags` template filter, which was thus also vulnerable.
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``strip_tags()`` now avoids recursive calls to ``HTMLParser`` when progress
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removing tags, but necessarily incomplete HTML entities, stops being made.
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Remember that absolutely NO guarantee is provided about the results of
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``strip_tags()`` being HTML safe. So NEVER mark safe the result of a
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``strip_tags()`` call without escaping it first, for example with
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:func:`django.utils.html.escape`.
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CVE-2019-14234: SQL injection possibility in key and index lookups for ``JSONField``/``HStoreField``
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====================================================================================================
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:lookup:`Key and index lookups <jsonfield.key>` for
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:class:`~django.contrib.postgres.fields.JSONField` and :lookup:`key lookups
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<hstorefield.key>` for :class:`~django.contrib.postgres.fields.HStoreField`
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were subject to SQL injection, using a suitably crafted dictionary, with
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dictionary expansion, as the ``**kwargs`` passed to ``QuerySet.filter()``.
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CVE-2019-14235: Potential memory exhaustion in ``django.utils.encoding.uri_to_iri()``
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=====================================================================================
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If passed certain inputs, :func:`django.utils.encoding.uri_to_iri` could lead
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to significant memory usage due to excessive recursion when re-percent-encoding
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invalid UTF-8 octet sequences.
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``uri_to_iri()`` now avoids recursion when re-percent-encoding invalid UTF-8
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octet sequences.
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