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Fixed CVE-2021-45115 -- Prevented DoS vector in UserAttributeSimilarityValidator.
Thanks Chris Bailey for the report. Co-authored-by: Adam Johnson <me@adamj.eu>
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@ -115,6 +115,36 @@ class MinimumLengthValidator:
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) % {'min_length': self.min_length}
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def exceeds_maximum_length_ratio(password, max_similarity, value):
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"""
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Test that value is within a reasonable range of password.
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The following ratio calculations are based on testing SequenceMatcher like
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this:
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for i in range(0,6):
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print(10**i, SequenceMatcher(a='A', b='A'*(10**i)).quick_ratio())
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which yields:
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1 1.0
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10 0.18181818181818182
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100 0.019801980198019802
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1000 0.001998001998001998
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10000 0.00019998000199980003
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100000 1.999980000199998e-05
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This means a length_ratio of 10 should never yield a similarity higher than
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0.2, for 100 this is down to 0.02 and for 1000 it is 0.002. This can be
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calculated via 2 / length_ratio. As a result we avoid the potentially
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expensive sequence matching.
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"""
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pwd_len = len(password)
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length_bound_similarity = max_similarity / 2 * pwd_len
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value_len = len(value)
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return pwd_len >= 10 * value_len and value_len < length_bound_similarity
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class UserAttributeSimilarityValidator:
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"""
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Validate that the password is sufficiently different from the user's
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@ -130,19 +160,25 @@ class UserAttributeSimilarityValidator:
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def __init__(self, user_attributes=DEFAULT_USER_ATTRIBUTES, max_similarity=0.7):
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self.user_attributes = user_attributes
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if max_similarity < 0.1:
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raise ValueError('max_similarity must be at least 0.1')
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self.max_similarity = max_similarity
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def validate(self, password, user=None):
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if not user:
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return
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password = password.lower()
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for attribute_name in self.user_attributes:
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value = getattr(user, attribute_name, None)
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if not value or not isinstance(value, str):
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continue
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value_parts = re.split(r'\W+', value) + [value]
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value_lower = value.lower()
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value_parts = re.split(r'\W+', value_lower) + [value_lower]
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for value_part in value_parts:
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if SequenceMatcher(a=password.lower(), b=value_part.lower()).quick_ratio() >= self.max_similarity:
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if exceeds_maximum_length_ratio(password, self.max_similarity, value_part):
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continue
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if SequenceMatcher(a=password, b=value_part).quick_ratio() >= self.max_similarity:
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try:
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verbose_name = str(user._meta.get_field(attribute_name).verbose_name)
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except FieldDoesNotExist:
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@ -7,4 +7,16 @@ Django 2.2.26 release notes
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Django 2.2.26 fixes one security issue with severity "medium" and two security
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issues with severity "low" in 2.2.25.
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...
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CVE-2021-45115: Denial-of-service possibility in ``UserAttributeSimilarityValidator``
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=====================================================================================
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:class:`.UserAttributeSimilarityValidator` incurred significant overhead
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evaluating submitted password that were artificially large in relative to the
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comparison values. On the assumption that access to user registration was
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unrestricted this provided a potential vector for a denial-of-service attack.
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In order to mitigate this issue, relatively long values are now ignored by
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``UserAttributeSimilarityValidator``.
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This issue has severity "medium" according to the :ref:`Django security policy
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<security-disclosure>`.
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@ -7,4 +7,16 @@ Django 3.2.11 release notes
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Django 3.2.11 fixes one security issue with severity "medium" and two security
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issues with severity "low" in 3.2.10.
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...
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CVE-2021-45115: Denial-of-service possibility in ``UserAttributeSimilarityValidator``
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=====================================================================================
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:class:`.UserAttributeSimilarityValidator` incurred significant overhead
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evaluating submitted password that were artificially large in relative to the
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comparison values. On the assumption that access to user registration was
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unrestricted this provided a potential vector for a denial-of-service attack.
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In order to mitigate this issue, relatively long values are now ignored by
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``UserAttributeSimilarityValidator``.
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This issue has severity "medium" according to the :ref:`Django security policy
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<security-disclosure>`.
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@ -7,6 +7,20 @@ Django 4.0.1 release notes
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Django 4.0.1 fixes one security issue with severity "medium", two security
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issues with severity "low", and several bugs in 4.0.
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CVE-2021-45115: Denial-of-service possibility in ``UserAttributeSimilarityValidator``
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=====================================================================================
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:class:`.UserAttributeSimilarityValidator` incurred significant overhead
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evaluating submitted password that were artificially large in relative to the
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comparison values. On the assumption that access to user registration was
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unrestricted this provided a potential vector for a denial-of-service attack.
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In order to mitigate this issue, relatively long values are now ignored by
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``UserAttributeSimilarityValidator``.
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This issue has severity "medium" according to the :ref:`Django security policy
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<security-disclosure>`.
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Bugfixes
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========
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@ -607,10 +607,16 @@ Django includes four validators:
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is used: ``'username', 'first_name', 'last_name', 'email'``.
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Attributes that don't exist are ignored.
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The minimum similarity of a rejected password can be set on a scale of 0 to
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1 with the ``max_similarity`` parameter. A setting of 0 rejects all
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passwords, whereas a setting of 1 rejects only passwords that are identical
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to an attribute's value.
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The maximum allowed similarity of passwords can be set on a scale of 0.1
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to 1.0 with the ``max_similarity`` parameter. This is compared to the
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result of :meth:`difflib.SequenceMatcher.quick_ratio`. A value of 0.1
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rejects passwords unless they are substantially different from the
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``user_attributes``, whereas a value of 1.0 rejects only passwords that are
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identical to an attribute's value.
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.. versionchanged:: 2.2.26
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The ``max_similarity`` parameter was limited to a minimum value of 0.1.
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.. class:: CommonPasswordValidator(password_list_path=DEFAULT_PASSWORD_LIST_PATH)
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@ -150,13 +150,10 @@ class UserAttributeSimilarityValidatorTest(TestCase):
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max_similarity=1,
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).validate(user.first_name, user=user)
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self.assertEqual(cm.exception.messages, [expected_error % "first name"])
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# max_similarity=0 rejects all passwords.
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with self.assertRaises(ValidationError) as cm:
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UserAttributeSimilarityValidator(
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user_attributes=['first_name'],
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max_similarity=0,
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).validate('XXX', user=user)
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self.assertEqual(cm.exception.messages, [expected_error % "first name"])
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# Very low max_similarity is rejected.
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msg = 'max_similarity must be at least 0.1'
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with self.assertRaisesMessage(ValueError, msg):
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UserAttributeSimilarityValidator(max_similarity=0.09)
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# Passes validation.
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self.assertIsNone(
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UserAttributeSimilarityValidator(user_attributes=['first_name']).validate('testclient', user=user)
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