mirror of
https://github.com/python/cpython.git
synced 2024-11-25 09:39:56 +01:00
a0b8b342c5
Use the _Py__has_attribute() macro in timemodule.c and bootstrap_hash.c to fix a build error on old GCC versions (GCC 4.8.5 on s390x).
598 lines
18 KiB
C
598 lines
18 KiB
C
#include "Python.h"
|
|
#include "pycore_fileutils.h" // _Py_fstat_noraise()
|
|
#include "pycore_initconfig.h"
|
|
#include "pycore_pylifecycle.h" // _PyOS_URandomNonblock()
|
|
#include "pycore_runtime.h" // _PyRuntime
|
|
|
|
#ifdef HAVE_UNISTD_H
|
|
# include <unistd.h> // close()
|
|
#endif
|
|
#ifdef MS_WINDOWS
|
|
# include <windows.h>
|
|
# include <bcrypt.h>
|
|
#else
|
|
# include <fcntl.h> // O_RDONLY
|
|
# ifdef HAVE_SYS_STAT_H
|
|
# include <sys/stat.h>
|
|
# endif
|
|
# ifdef HAVE_LINUX_RANDOM_H
|
|
# include <linux/random.h> // GRND_NONBLOCK
|
|
# endif
|
|
# if defined(HAVE_SYS_RANDOM_H) && (defined(HAVE_GETRANDOM) || defined(HAVE_GETENTROPY))
|
|
# include <sys/random.h> // getrandom()
|
|
# endif
|
|
# if !defined(HAVE_GETRANDOM) && defined(HAVE_GETRANDOM_SYSCALL)
|
|
# include <sys/syscall.h> // SYS_getrandom
|
|
# endif
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
#ifdef _Py_MEMORY_SANITIZER
|
|
# include <sanitizer/msan_interface.h>
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
#if defined(__APPLE__) && defined(__has_builtin)
|
|
# if __has_builtin(__builtin_available)
|
|
# define HAVE_GETENTRYPY_GETRANDOM_RUNTIME __builtin_available(macOS 10.12, iOS 10.10, tvOS 10.0, watchOS 3.0, *)
|
|
# endif
|
|
#endif
|
|
#ifndef HAVE_GETENTRYPY_GETRANDOM_RUNTIME
|
|
# define HAVE_GETENTRYPY_GETRANDOM_RUNTIME 1
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
|
|
#ifdef Py_DEBUG
|
|
int _Py_HashSecret_Initialized = 0;
|
|
#else
|
|
static int _Py_HashSecret_Initialized = 0;
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
#ifdef MS_WINDOWS
|
|
|
|
/* Fill buffer with size pseudo-random bytes generated by the Windows CryptoGen
|
|
API. Return 0 on success, or raise an exception and return -1 on error. */
|
|
static int
|
|
win32_urandom(unsigned char *buffer, Py_ssize_t size, int raise)
|
|
{
|
|
while (size > 0)
|
|
{
|
|
DWORD chunk = (DWORD)Py_MIN(size, PY_DWORD_MAX);
|
|
NTSTATUS status = BCryptGenRandom(NULL, buffer, chunk, BCRYPT_USE_SYSTEM_PREFERRED_RNG);
|
|
if (!BCRYPT_SUCCESS(status)) {
|
|
/* BCryptGenRandom() failed */
|
|
if (raise) {
|
|
PyErr_SetFromWindowsErr(0);
|
|
}
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
buffer += chunk;
|
|
size -= chunk;
|
|
}
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#else /* !MS_WINDOWS */
|
|
|
|
#if defined(HAVE_GETRANDOM) || defined(HAVE_GETRANDOM_SYSCALL)
|
|
#define PY_GETRANDOM 1
|
|
|
|
/* Call getrandom() to get random bytes:
|
|
|
|
- Return 1 on success
|
|
- Return 0 if getrandom() is not available (failed with ENOSYS or EPERM),
|
|
or if getrandom(GRND_NONBLOCK) failed with EAGAIN (system urandom not
|
|
initialized yet) and raise=0.
|
|
- Raise an exception (if raise is non-zero) and return -1 on error:
|
|
if getrandom() failed with EINTR, raise is non-zero and the Python signal
|
|
handler raised an exception, or if getrandom() failed with a different
|
|
error.
|
|
|
|
getrandom() is retried if it failed with EINTR: interrupted by a signal. */
|
|
static int
|
|
py_getrandom(void *buffer, Py_ssize_t size, int blocking, int raise)
|
|
{
|
|
/* Is getrandom() supported by the running kernel? Set to 0 if getrandom()
|
|
failed with ENOSYS or EPERM. Need Linux kernel 3.17 or newer, or Solaris
|
|
11.3 or newer */
|
|
static int getrandom_works = 1;
|
|
int flags;
|
|
char *dest;
|
|
long n;
|
|
|
|
if (!getrandom_works) {
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
flags = blocking ? 0 : GRND_NONBLOCK;
|
|
dest = buffer;
|
|
while (0 < size) {
|
|
#if defined(__sun) && defined(__SVR4)
|
|
/* Issue #26735: On Solaris, getrandom() is limited to returning up
|
|
to 1024 bytes. Call it multiple times if more bytes are
|
|
requested. */
|
|
n = Py_MIN(size, 1024);
|
|
#else
|
|
n = Py_MIN(size, LONG_MAX);
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
errno = 0;
|
|
#ifdef HAVE_GETRANDOM
|
|
if (raise) {
|
|
Py_BEGIN_ALLOW_THREADS
|
|
n = getrandom(dest, n, flags);
|
|
Py_END_ALLOW_THREADS
|
|
}
|
|
else {
|
|
n = getrandom(dest, n, flags);
|
|
}
|
|
#else
|
|
/* On Linux, use the syscall() function because the GNU libc doesn't
|
|
expose the Linux getrandom() syscall yet. See:
|
|
https://sourceware.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=17252 */
|
|
if (raise) {
|
|
Py_BEGIN_ALLOW_THREADS
|
|
n = syscall(SYS_getrandom, dest, n, flags);
|
|
Py_END_ALLOW_THREADS
|
|
}
|
|
else {
|
|
n = syscall(SYS_getrandom, dest, n, flags);
|
|
}
|
|
# ifdef _Py_MEMORY_SANITIZER
|
|
if (n > 0) {
|
|
__msan_unpoison(dest, n);
|
|
}
|
|
# endif
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
if (n < 0) {
|
|
/* ENOSYS: the syscall is not supported by the kernel.
|
|
EPERM: the syscall is blocked by a security policy (ex: SECCOMP)
|
|
or something else. */
|
|
if (errno == ENOSYS || errno == EPERM) {
|
|
getrandom_works = 0;
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* getrandom(GRND_NONBLOCK) fails with EAGAIN if the system urandom
|
|
is not initialized yet. For _PyRandom_Init(), we ignore the
|
|
error and fall back on reading /dev/urandom which never blocks,
|
|
even if the system urandom is not initialized yet:
|
|
see the PEP 524. */
|
|
if (errno == EAGAIN && !raise && !blocking) {
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (errno == EINTR) {
|
|
if (raise) {
|
|
if (PyErr_CheckSignals()) {
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* retry getrandom() if it was interrupted by a signal */
|
|
continue;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (raise) {
|
|
PyErr_SetFromErrno(PyExc_OSError);
|
|
}
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
dest += n;
|
|
size -= n;
|
|
}
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#elif defined(HAVE_GETENTROPY)
|
|
#define PY_GETENTROPY 1
|
|
|
|
/* Fill buffer with size pseudo-random bytes generated by getentropy():
|
|
|
|
- Return 1 on success
|
|
- Return 0 if getentropy() syscall is not available (failed with ENOSYS or
|
|
EPERM).
|
|
- Raise an exception (if raise is non-zero) and return -1 on error:
|
|
if getentropy() failed with EINTR, raise is non-zero and the Python signal
|
|
handler raised an exception, or if getentropy() failed with a different
|
|
error.
|
|
|
|
getentropy() is retried if it failed with EINTR: interrupted by a signal. */
|
|
|
|
#if defined(__APPLE__) && _Py__has_attribute(availability)
|
|
static int
|
|
py_getentropy(char *buffer, Py_ssize_t size, int raise)
|
|
__attribute__((availability(macos,introduced=10.12)))
|
|
__attribute__((availability(ios,introduced=10.0)))
|
|
__attribute__((availability(tvos,introduced=10.0)))
|
|
__attribute__((availability(watchos,introduced=3.0)));
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
static int
|
|
py_getentropy(char *buffer, Py_ssize_t size, int raise)
|
|
{
|
|
/* Is getentropy() supported by the running kernel? Set to 0 if
|
|
getentropy() failed with ENOSYS or EPERM. */
|
|
static int getentropy_works = 1;
|
|
|
|
if (!getentropy_works) {
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
while (size > 0) {
|
|
/* getentropy() is limited to returning up to 256 bytes. Call it
|
|
multiple times if more bytes are requested. */
|
|
Py_ssize_t len = Py_MIN(size, 256);
|
|
int res;
|
|
|
|
if (raise) {
|
|
Py_BEGIN_ALLOW_THREADS
|
|
res = getentropy(buffer, len);
|
|
Py_END_ALLOW_THREADS
|
|
}
|
|
else {
|
|
res = getentropy(buffer, len);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (res < 0) {
|
|
/* ENOSYS: the syscall is not supported by the running kernel.
|
|
EPERM: the syscall is blocked by a security policy (ex: SECCOMP)
|
|
or something else. */
|
|
if (errno == ENOSYS || errno == EPERM) {
|
|
getentropy_works = 0;
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (errno == EINTR) {
|
|
if (raise) {
|
|
if (PyErr_CheckSignals()) {
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* retry getentropy() if it was interrupted by a signal */
|
|
continue;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (raise) {
|
|
PyErr_SetFromErrno(PyExc_OSError);
|
|
}
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
buffer += len;
|
|
size -= len;
|
|
}
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
#endif /* defined(HAVE_GETENTROPY) && !(defined(__sun) && defined(__SVR4)) */
|
|
|
|
|
|
#define urandom_cache (_PyRuntime.pyhash_state.urandom_cache)
|
|
|
|
/* Read random bytes from the /dev/urandom device:
|
|
|
|
- Return 0 on success
|
|
- Raise an exception (if raise is non-zero) and return -1 on error
|
|
|
|
Possible causes of errors:
|
|
|
|
- open() failed with ENOENT, ENXIO, ENODEV, EACCES: the /dev/urandom device
|
|
was not found. For example, it was removed manually or not exposed in a
|
|
chroot or container.
|
|
- open() failed with a different error
|
|
- fstat() failed
|
|
- read() failed or returned 0
|
|
|
|
read() is retried if it failed with EINTR: interrupted by a signal.
|
|
|
|
The file descriptor of the device is kept open between calls to avoid using
|
|
many file descriptors when run in parallel from multiple threads:
|
|
see the issue #18756.
|
|
|
|
st_dev and st_ino fields of the file descriptor (from fstat()) are cached to
|
|
check if the file descriptor was replaced by a different file (which is
|
|
likely a bug in the application): see the issue #21207.
|
|
|
|
If the file descriptor was closed or replaced, open a new file descriptor
|
|
but don't close the old file descriptor: it probably points to something
|
|
important for some third-party code. */
|
|
static int
|
|
dev_urandom(char *buffer, Py_ssize_t size, int raise)
|
|
{
|
|
int fd;
|
|
Py_ssize_t n;
|
|
|
|
if (raise) {
|
|
struct _Py_stat_struct st;
|
|
int fstat_result;
|
|
|
|
if (urandom_cache.fd >= 0) {
|
|
Py_BEGIN_ALLOW_THREADS
|
|
fstat_result = _Py_fstat_noraise(urandom_cache.fd, &st);
|
|
Py_END_ALLOW_THREADS
|
|
|
|
/* Does the fd point to the same thing as before? (issue #21207) */
|
|
if (fstat_result
|
|
|| st.st_dev != urandom_cache.st_dev
|
|
|| st.st_ino != urandom_cache.st_ino) {
|
|
/* Something changed: forget the cached fd (but don't close it,
|
|
since it probably points to something important for some
|
|
third-party code). */
|
|
urandom_cache.fd = -1;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
if (urandom_cache.fd >= 0)
|
|
fd = urandom_cache.fd;
|
|
else {
|
|
fd = _Py_open("/dev/urandom", O_RDONLY);
|
|
if (fd < 0) {
|
|
if (errno == ENOENT || errno == ENXIO ||
|
|
errno == ENODEV || errno == EACCES) {
|
|
PyErr_SetString(PyExc_NotImplementedError,
|
|
"/dev/urandom (or equivalent) not found");
|
|
}
|
|
/* otherwise, keep the OSError exception raised by _Py_open() */
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
if (urandom_cache.fd >= 0) {
|
|
/* urandom_fd was initialized by another thread while we were
|
|
not holding the GIL, keep it. */
|
|
close(fd);
|
|
fd = urandom_cache.fd;
|
|
}
|
|
else {
|
|
if (_Py_fstat(fd, &st)) {
|
|
close(fd);
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
else {
|
|
urandom_cache.fd = fd;
|
|
urandom_cache.st_dev = st.st_dev;
|
|
urandom_cache.st_ino = st.st_ino;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
do {
|
|
n = _Py_read(fd, buffer, (size_t)size);
|
|
if (n == -1)
|
|
return -1;
|
|
if (n == 0) {
|
|
PyErr_Format(PyExc_RuntimeError,
|
|
"Failed to read %zi bytes from /dev/urandom",
|
|
size);
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
buffer += n;
|
|
size -= n;
|
|
} while (0 < size);
|
|
}
|
|
else {
|
|
fd = _Py_open_noraise("/dev/urandom", O_RDONLY);
|
|
if (fd < 0) {
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
while (0 < size)
|
|
{
|
|
do {
|
|
n = read(fd, buffer, (size_t)size);
|
|
} while (n < 0 && errno == EINTR);
|
|
|
|
if (n <= 0) {
|
|
/* stop on error or if read(size) returned 0 */
|
|
close(fd);
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
buffer += n;
|
|
size -= n;
|
|
}
|
|
close(fd);
|
|
}
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static void
|
|
dev_urandom_close(void)
|
|
{
|
|
if (urandom_cache.fd >= 0) {
|
|
close(urandom_cache.fd);
|
|
urandom_cache.fd = -1;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#undef urandom_cache
|
|
|
|
#endif /* !MS_WINDOWS */
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Fill buffer with pseudo-random bytes generated by a linear congruent
|
|
generator (LCG):
|
|
|
|
x(n+1) = (x(n) * 214013 + 2531011) % 2^32
|
|
|
|
Use bits 23..16 of x(n) to generate a byte. */
|
|
static void
|
|
lcg_urandom(unsigned int x0, unsigned char *buffer, size_t size)
|
|
{
|
|
size_t index;
|
|
unsigned int x;
|
|
|
|
x = x0;
|
|
for (index=0; index < size; index++) {
|
|
x *= 214013;
|
|
x += 2531011;
|
|
/* modulo 2 ^ (8 * sizeof(int)) */
|
|
buffer[index] = (x >> 16) & 0xff;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Read random bytes:
|
|
|
|
- Return 0 on success
|
|
- Raise an exception (if raise is non-zero) and return -1 on error
|
|
|
|
Used sources of entropy ordered by preference, preferred source first:
|
|
|
|
- BCryptGenRandom() on Windows
|
|
- getrandom() function (ex: Linux and Solaris): call py_getrandom()
|
|
- getentropy() function (ex: OpenBSD): call py_getentropy()
|
|
- /dev/urandom device
|
|
|
|
Read from the /dev/urandom device if getrandom() or getentropy() function
|
|
is not available or does not work.
|
|
|
|
Prefer getrandom() over getentropy() because getrandom() supports blocking
|
|
and non-blocking mode: see the PEP 524. Python requires non-blocking RNG at
|
|
startup to initialize its hash secret, but os.urandom() must block until the
|
|
system urandom is initialized (at least on Linux 3.17 and newer).
|
|
|
|
Prefer getrandom() and getentropy() over reading directly /dev/urandom
|
|
because these functions don't need file descriptors and so avoid ENFILE or
|
|
EMFILE errors (too many open files): see the issue #18756.
|
|
|
|
Only the getrandom() function supports non-blocking mode.
|
|
|
|
Only use RNG running in the kernel. They are more secure because it is
|
|
harder to get the internal state of a RNG running in the kernel land than a
|
|
RNG running in the user land. The kernel has a direct access to the hardware
|
|
and has access to hardware RNG, they are used as entropy sources.
|
|
|
|
Note: the OpenSSL RAND_pseudo_bytes() function does not automatically reseed
|
|
its RNG on fork(), two child processes (with the same pid) generate the same
|
|
random numbers: see issue #18747. Kernel RNGs don't have this issue,
|
|
they have access to good quality entropy sources.
|
|
|
|
If raise is zero:
|
|
|
|
- Don't raise an exception on error
|
|
- Don't call the Python signal handler (don't call PyErr_CheckSignals()) if
|
|
a function fails with EINTR: retry directly the interrupted function
|
|
- Don't release the GIL to call functions.
|
|
*/
|
|
static int
|
|
pyurandom(void *buffer, Py_ssize_t size, int blocking, int raise)
|
|
{
|
|
#if defined(PY_GETRANDOM) || defined(PY_GETENTROPY)
|
|
int res;
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
if (size < 0) {
|
|
if (raise) {
|
|
PyErr_Format(PyExc_ValueError,
|
|
"negative argument not allowed");
|
|
}
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (size == 0) {
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#ifdef MS_WINDOWS
|
|
return win32_urandom((unsigned char *)buffer, size, raise);
|
|
#else
|
|
|
|
#if defined(PY_GETRANDOM) || defined(PY_GETENTROPY)
|
|
if (HAVE_GETENTRYPY_GETRANDOM_RUNTIME) {
|
|
#ifdef PY_GETRANDOM
|
|
res = py_getrandom(buffer, size, blocking, raise);
|
|
#else
|
|
res = py_getentropy(buffer, size, raise);
|
|
#endif
|
|
if (res < 0) {
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
if (res == 1) {
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
/* getrandom() or getentropy() function is not available: failed with
|
|
ENOSYS or EPERM. Fall back on reading from /dev/urandom. */
|
|
} /* end of availability block */
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
return dev_urandom(buffer, size, raise);
|
|
#endif
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Fill buffer with size pseudo-random bytes from the operating system random
|
|
number generator (RNG). It is suitable for most cryptographic purposes
|
|
except long living private keys for asymmetric encryption.
|
|
|
|
On Linux 3.17 and newer, the getrandom() syscall is used in blocking mode:
|
|
block until the system urandom entropy pool is initialized (128 bits are
|
|
collected by the kernel).
|
|
|
|
Return 0 on success. Raise an exception and return -1 on error. */
|
|
int
|
|
_PyOS_URandom(void *buffer, Py_ssize_t size)
|
|
{
|
|
return pyurandom(buffer, size, 1, 1);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Fill buffer with size pseudo-random bytes from the operating system random
|
|
number generator (RNG). It is not suitable for cryptographic purpose.
|
|
|
|
On Linux 3.17 and newer (when getrandom() syscall is used), if the system
|
|
urandom is not initialized yet, the function returns "weak" entropy read
|
|
from /dev/urandom.
|
|
|
|
Return 0 on success. Raise an exception and return -1 on error. */
|
|
int
|
|
_PyOS_URandomNonblock(void *buffer, Py_ssize_t size)
|
|
{
|
|
return pyurandom(buffer, size, 0, 1);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
PyStatus
|
|
_Py_HashRandomization_Init(const PyConfig *config)
|
|
{
|
|
void *secret = &_Py_HashSecret;
|
|
Py_ssize_t secret_size = sizeof(_Py_HashSecret_t);
|
|
|
|
if (_Py_HashSecret_Initialized) {
|
|
return _PyStatus_OK();
|
|
}
|
|
_Py_HashSecret_Initialized = 1;
|
|
|
|
if (config->use_hash_seed) {
|
|
if (config->hash_seed == 0) {
|
|
/* disable the randomized hash */
|
|
memset(secret, 0, secret_size);
|
|
}
|
|
else {
|
|
/* use the specified hash seed */
|
|
lcg_urandom(config->hash_seed, secret, secret_size);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
else {
|
|
/* use a random hash seed */
|
|
int res;
|
|
|
|
/* _PyRandom_Init() is called very early in the Python initialization
|
|
and so exceptions cannot be used (use raise=0).
|
|
|
|
_PyRandom_Init() must not block Python initialization: call
|
|
pyurandom() is non-blocking mode (blocking=0): see the PEP 524. */
|
|
res = pyurandom(secret, secret_size, 0, 0);
|
|
if (res < 0) {
|
|
return _PyStatus_ERR("failed to get random numbers "
|
|
"to initialize Python");
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
return _PyStatus_OK();
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
void
|
|
_Py_HashRandomization_Fini(void)
|
|
{
|
|
#ifndef MS_WINDOWS
|
|
dev_urandom_close();
|
|
#endif
|
|
}
|